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The “War on Terror” is Over – Now What?  Restoring 
the Four Freedoms as a Foundation for Peace and 
Security 
Mark R. Shulman* 
As for our common defense, we reject as false the choice between 
our safety and our ideals.  Our founding fathers faced with perils 
that we can scarcely imagine, drafted a charter to assure the rule 
of law and the rights of man, a charter expanded by the blood of 
generations.  Those ideals still light the world, and we will not give 
them up for expedience’s sake.  And so, to all other peoples and 
governments who are watching today, from the grandest capitals to 
the small village where my father was born: know that America is a 
friend of each nation and every man, woman and child who seeks a 
future of peace and dignity, and we are ready to lead once more. 
  —Barack H. Obama 
  Inaugural Address, Jan. 20, 20091 
The so-called “War on Terror” has ended.2  By the end of his first week 
in office, President Barack H. Obama had begun the process of dismantling 
some of the most notorious “wartime” measures.3  A few weeks before, 
recently re-appointed Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates had clearly 
forsaken the contentious label in a post-election essay on U.S. strategy in 
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history), Oxford University; Ph.D. (history), University of California, Berkeley; J.D., 
Columbia University School of Law.  Harold Hongju Koh’s presentation at the 2006 annual 
meeting of the American Association of Law Schools, Section on National Security Law, 
provided the initial inspiration for this article.  Three years later, this article won that 
section’s writing competition and was presented at the annual meeting in January 2009.  A 
previous iteration of this article appeared in the Fordham Law Review. See Mark R. 
Shulman, The Four Freedoms as Good Law and Grand Strategy in a Time of Insecurity, 77 
FORDHAM L. REV. 555 (2008).  The author is sincerely grateful for the diligent and 
thoughtful contributions of that journal’s editors.  He also benefited from comments by 
Stephen I. Vladeck and Sasha Greenawalt.  Any comments should be addressed to the author 
at Shulman@aya.yale.edu. 
 1. President Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/. 
 2. See Dana Priest, Bush’s ‘War’ on Terror Comes to a Sudden End WASH. POST, 
Jan. 23, 2009; Accord, more recently and somewhat more definitively, Jay Solomon, U.S. 
Drops ‘War on Terror’ Phrase, Clinton Says WALL. ST. J., Mar. 31, 2009. 
 3. See Exec. Order – Review And Disposition of Individuals Detained at The 
Guantánamo Bay Naval Base and Closure of Detention Facilities, Executive Office Of The 
President, (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/ClosureOf 
GuantanamoDetentionFacilities/; Exec. Order – Review of Detention Policy Options, 
Executive Office of The President, (2009), available at http://www.whitehouse. 
gov/the_press_ office/ReviewofDetentionPolicyOptions/; and Exec.  Order – Ensuring 
Lawful Interrogations, Executive Office of The President, (2009), available at http://www. 
whitehouse. gov/the_press_office/EnsuringLawfulInterrogations/.  
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Foreign Affairs.4  Gates noted this historic shift in an almost off-handed 
way: “What is dubbed the war on terror is, in grim reality, a prolonged, 
worldwide irregular campaign – a struggle between the forces of violent 
extremism and those of moderation.”5  At the same time, the Obama 
administration is taking care to reconfirm its commitment to defending the 
United States and its interests against the threat of radical Islamists, among 
others.  However, because it is hard to replace something with nothing,6 the 
President should go further and offer a positive formulation – based on 
good law as well as sound policy – of how he will lead us to a “future of 
peace and dignity.”  He should restore Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Four 
Freedoms to a central place in the nation’s grand strategy. 
* * * 
In the future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward 
to a world founded upon four essential human freedoms. 
The first is freedom of speech and expression--everywhere in the 
world. 
The second is freedom of every person to worship God in his own 
way – everywhere in the world. 
The third is freedom from want--which, translated into universal 
terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every 
nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants – everywhere in 
the world. 
The fourth is freedom from fear – which, translated into world 
terms, means a world-wide reduction of armaments to such a point 
and in such a thorough fashion that no nation will be in a position 
to commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor  – 
anywhere in the world. 
 4. Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy: Reprogramming the Pentagon for a New 
Age” 88 FOR. AFF. 28, 29 (Jan./Feb. 2009).  Other observers have been pointing to the 
inaptness of the term “war on terror” for years.  For an early and notable example, see It Is 
Meaningless and Dangerous to Declare War against Terrorism, THE INDEPENDENT (Sept. 
17, 2001), available at http://www.independent.co.uk/opinion/leading-articles/it-is-
meaningless-and-dangerous-to-declare-war-against-terrorism-669538.html.  See also Mark 
R. Shulman, J’accuse for the Bush Administration, 3 NYU J. L. & SEC. 39, 40 (Fall 2004) 
(book review) (favorably reviewing Richard A. Clarke’s Against All Enemies but faulting its 
embrace of a “war on terror”); PHILIP H. GORDON, WINNING THE RIGHT WAR: THE PATH TO 
SECURITY FOR AMERICA AND THE WORLD 4 (2007) (arguing that, formulated as a global war 
on terror, the fight against terrorism has been fundamentally flawed from the start); RICHARD 
N. HAASS, THE OPPORTUNITY: AMERICA’S MOMENT TO ALTER HISTORY’S COURSE 58 (2005) 
(“So if terrorism is not a war, how should we understand it?  Perhaps as a disease.”). 
 5. Gates, supra note 4, at 29. 
 6. IAN SHAPIRO, CONTAINMENT: REBUILDING A STRATEGY AGAINST GLOBAL TERROR 
(2007) (political scientist proposing a strategy of containment because the U.S. faces real 
threats that are not subsumable into a war and that “you can’t beat something with nothing”) 
4 ff. 
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That is no vision of a distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a 
kind of world attainable in our own time and generation. That kind 
of world is the very antithesis of the so-called new order of tyranny 
which the dictators seek to create with the crash of a bomb.7 
  —Franklin D. Roosevelt 
  Annual Address to Congress, Jan. 6, 1941 
When President Roosevelt articulated the Four Freedoms in January 
1941, he was promulgating a vision for a postwar world system of states 
dedicated to the promotion of respect for human dignity as a means to 
ensure security.  Roosevelt called for policies that would make the world 
more secure by promoting freedom of speech and expression, freedom of 
every person to worship God in his own way, freedom from want, and a 
freedom from fear.  This article examines FDR’s intentions and the 
subsequent history of the Four Freedoms in order to reveal how the Four 
Freedoms offer a principled and flexible paradigm for addressing the 
challenges and opportunities of an era characterized by a rapidly changing 
and formidable range of security challenges.  It argues that the Four 
Freedoms offer a more apt decision making framework than did the ill-
defined and alienating framework of a “War on Terror.”  In place of an 
unending and unbounded war, they offer a paradigm of enduring values that 
would inform more humane policies and facilitate more rational decision 
making.  The Four Freedoms point the way to a grand strategy or national 
policy that promotes long-term security, prosperity, and justice. 
This article employs an interdisciplinary methodology, relying on the 
tools of history, political science, and strategic studies, as well as a form of 
constitutional interpretation that owes much to Justice Stephen Breyer’s 
concept of “active liberty.”8  This article explores the ways that the Four 
Freedoms were framed to address the dire circumstances of the Second 
World War.  It analyzes the historical context of the 1940s in which the 
Four Freedoms first emerged, how they formed the basis of the 
International Bill of Human Rights, and how they evolved over the decades 
that followed.  The history explains how the values they embody were 
quickly embraced around the world and then misplaced during the Cold 
War.  When the Four Freedoms framed the American mission, the nation 
basked in unparalleled good will and wielded tremendous soft power.  As 
security policy strayed from the principles they embodied, the nation’s 
ability to inspire and lead also diminished.  Restored to their proper place, 
the Four Freedoms promise a more effective grand strategy than a “War on 
Terror” – one that relies more on demonstrating inspired leadership than on 
7. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 87 Cong. 
Rec. 44, 46 (1941). 
 8. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC 
CONSTITUTION (2005). 
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fighting and winning wars.   
Part I introduces the argument that the Four Freedoms reflect 
fundamental legal norms and that they offer a framework upon which to 
develop a wise policy to promote meaningful and enduring peace and 
security.  Part II describes the historical origins of the Four Freedoms.  
Roosevelt developed them as an articulation of American values and 
objectives specifically in order to lead the nation to defeat an unprecedented 
threat.  He based them on his faith in American civil rights and his 
experience facing down widespread want and fear.  The Four Freedoms 
were almost immediately incorporated into the Atlantic Charter as a 
mission statement for the Allies.  After the war, they were also incorporated 
into the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other basic 
components of international law.  Part III examines the ways in which 
definitions of the Four Freedoms – particularly the freedom from fear – 
drifted during the Cold War era, plucked apart by those seeking to promote 
one or another freedom, people who ignored FDR’s original formulation of 
the Four Freedoms as a coherent strategy.  This conceptual drift enabled 
presidential administration of George W. Bush to prioritize the freedom 
from fear at the expense of other important values.  This distortion 
promoted a dangerous grand strategy that emphasized fighting wars and 
thus precipitated resentment and instability around the world rather than the 
empathy, support and peaceful relations that would have bolstered 
American security.  Part IV further develops the proposition that the Four 
Freedoms present a compelling paradigm for peace and security today.  
Strategic adjustment is most effective when guided by a clear and 
compelling statement of objectives.  The prospect of restoring the Four 
Freedoms to a central place in U.S. grand strategy offers such an 
opportunity.  The article concludes by returning to the Anglo-American 
security partnership which forged the Four Freedoms in 1941 and calls for a 
recommitment to the vision of a peaceful world articulated by FDR and 
embraced by Winston Churchill, among others.  When the Four Freedoms 
are treated as a package, they offer not only inspiration, but also a well-
balanced framework for formulating effective policies to rationally address 
such issues as the global economic crisis, climate change, and widespread 
poverty, as well as the threats posed by radical jihad.   
I.  THE FOUR FREEDOMS AS BASIC LAW AND WISE POLICY 
Taken together and read generously, the Four Freedoms articulate 
sound policy for promoting long-term security and prosperity for the people 
of the United States and around the world.  They were forged in the United 
States, tempered by the fire of World War II, and honed by the adoption of 
the International Bill of Human Rights.9  If restored to a central place in 
 9. For more on the International Bill of Human Rights, see Office of the High 
Comm’r for Human Rights, Fact Sheet No. 2 (Rev. 1), The International Bill of Human 
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U.S. grand strategy and implemented thoughtfully today, they should 
advance security interests by reducing the threats posed by violent 
extremists and presenting new opportunities for the spread of liberty and 
prosperity. 
President Roosevelt originally presented the Four Freedoms as a 
bundle, enumerating them one by one.  “The first is freedom of speech and 
expression everywhere in the world.  The second is freedom of every 
person to worship God in his own way, everywhere in the world.”10  
Clearly, FDR borrowed these first two freedoms from the Constitution’s 
First Amendment.  For the third, he drew on his own New Deal programs 
and signaled the need for international cooperation in order to achieve their 
objectives globally.  “The third is freedom from want, which, translated into 
world terms, means economic understandings which will secure to every 
nation a healthy peacetime life for its inhabitants everywhere in the 
world.”11  Finally, and most famously, Roosevelt addressed what he viewed 
as the particular circumstances necessitating his new policy and how to 
avoid the tragic destructiveness of war in the future.  “The fourth is freedom 
from fear – which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide 
reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that 
no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression 
against any neighbor – anywhere in the world.”12 
Over the next few years, the Four Freedoms were incorporated part and 
parcel into the foundational documents of modern international law.  As 
such, they offer a broadly legitimate framework for policy formation and 
decision making.  As the historical section below will describe, FDR first 
enunciated the Four Freedoms in January 1941.  A few months later, they 
were subsumed by the Atlantic Charter that cemented the Anglo-American 
alliance.  The 1945 Charter of the United Nations included them as basic 
principles.13  The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
incorporated them as inherent to human dignity and thus inalienable.14  The 
Rights (1996), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu6/2/fs2.htm (“The International 
Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols.”). 
 10. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 87 CONG. 
REC. 44, 46 (1941). 
 11. Id. 
 12. Id. at 47. 
 13. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 14. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), U.N. Doc. A/810 
(Dec. 10, 1948).  For an exemplary discussion of the extent to which the Universal 
Declaration represents a set of legal obligations, see Hurst Hannum, The Status of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in National and International Law 25 GA. J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 287 (1996) and see RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 701, 
n. 6 (1987) (“The binding character of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights continues 
to be debated . . . but the Declaration has become the accepted general articulation of 
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International Covenants on Civil and Political and on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights clearly embrace them.15  Clearly, the Four Freedoms 
express fundamental norms of international law.  Because these norms are 
so succinctly articulated, so universally admired and so thoroughly 
internalized in legal cultures around the world, they constitute a valuable 
tool for promoting peace and security.  They offer the hope of an enduring 
peace based on the rule of law – not one that rests on fighting long, multiple 
or unilateral wars.  
 
II.  THE ORIGINS OF THE FOUR FREEDOMS AMIDST GLOBAL CRISIS 
[T]he only thing we have to fear is fear itself – nameless, unreasoning, 
unjustified terror which paralyzes needed efforts to convert retreat into 
advance.16 
By January 1941, the lawless, hyper-aggressive and highly successful 
Axis war machine threatened freedom everywhere.  The fall of French 
Republic in the summer of 1940 clearly demonstrated to American 
authorities that the expanding geopolitical crisis could no longer be ignored.  
At that point, the Axis powers of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial 
Japan had conquered or otherwise come to dominate significant portions of 
Europe and Asia, including Austria, Czechoslovakia, the Benelux countries, 
Greece, Norway, Yugoslavia, Korea, much of China, and Southeast Asia.  
America’s ultimate entry into the war seemed inevitable to many, including 
most likely to President Roosevelt.  That November, however, he was re-
elected for an unprecedented third term, campaigning on a promise that 
“[y]our boys are not going to be sent into any foreign wars.”17  In the fall of 
recognized rights”). 
 15. See, e.g., infra note __ and accompanying text.  The International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights recognizes that “the ideal of free human beings enjoying civil and 
political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are 
created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic, 
social, and cultural rights.”  999 U.N.T.S. 171 (opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966) (entered 
into force Mar.23, 1976) (emphasis added).  Likewise, the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights recognizes that “the ideal of free human beings 
enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieve if conditions are created whereby 
everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as his civil and 
political rights.”  opened for signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan 
3, 1976). 
 16. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933), in Text of 
the Inaugural Address; President for Vigorous Action, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 1933, at 1. 
 17. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Campaign Address at Boston, Massachusetts: We 
Are Going Full Speed Ahead! (Oct. 30, 1940), in 10 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 517 (Samuel I. Rosenman ed., 1950).  Questions about Roosevelt’s 
views on the inevitability of U.S. entry into the war have been the subject of inexhaustible 
debates.  See generally DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT, supra note __; and for a 
summary of these debates, see CHRISTOPHER ANDREW, FOR THE PRESIDENT’S EYES ONLY: 
SECRET INTELLIGENCE AND THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH, chapter 
3 “Franklin D. Roosevelt: The Path to Pearl Harbor.” 
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1940, FDR probably did not believe his own campaign rhetoric, but making 
it appears to have been necessary for his re-election.  In retrospect, the 
dubious sincerity of FDR’s promise seems both obvious and excusable.  
Facing isolationist sentiment at home and a fast-spreading war, he had no 
easy choices.  Speaking for the only major European power holding out 
against the Axis, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and King George VI 
had convinced FDR of the need to support Great Britain in its hour of need.  
Churchill warned FDR that, without cash and supplies, Britain would also 
succumb to the Axis juggernaut leaving the U.S. alone among the 
remaining free powers.  Roosevelt understood that the plucky Royal Air 
Force and mighty Royal Navy presented the only meaningful bulwarks 
against this catastrophe.18  Yet most Americans continued to oppose any 
policy that might lead their country into war.  As one contemporary 
historian bitterly observed of this isolationist impulse, 
[t]he country was not ready to make or meet an enemy.  Most 
Americans were still spending their days slackly, insulated from 
calls upon their energies, fortunes, or lives.  Until they were 
brought to the cold hard drill ground only a foolish diplomacy 
would have hastened a crisis.  But only a negligent diplomacy 
would have failed to get ready for one, if the United States intended 
to hold fast to the course it was on.19 
FDR demonstrated extraordinary leadership by paying respect to the widely 
held isolationist views while doing everything possible to prevent an 
irreversible disaster. 
To avoid this calamity, FDR planned to offer to lend or lease war 
materiel to the British, but first he needed the support of Congress and the 
American people.  A few months before and without authorization from 
Congress, Roosevelt had traded fifty old flush-deck naval destroyers in 
exchange for leases on British territorial possessions in the Western 
Hemisphere.  To launch his new plan, FDR chose the occasion of his 
January 6, 1941 Annual Address to Congress.  In order to meet growing 
Congressional concerns about being shut out of the process and to minimize 
the impression that he was taking the country to war through the back door 
(a charge that President Woodrow Wilson faced often between 1914 and 
1917), Roosevelt couched his new initiative in a soothing metaphor that he 
presented to Congress.  FDR likened the program to lending a garden hose 
to a neighbor whose house was on fire.  Suppressing the fire would end the 
threat of its spread, and then the neighbor would simply return the hose.20  
 18.  Divine, The Reluctant Belligerent, supra note __ 92-96. 
 19. HERBERT FEIS, THE ROAD TO PEARL HARBOR: THE COMING OF WAR BETWEEN THE 
UNITED STATES AND JAPAN 124-25 (1950). 
 20. The literature on Lend-Lease is vast.  For accessible and reliable overviews, see 
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This “Lend-Lease,” FDR claimed, would reduce the likelihood that the 
America’s home would engulfed in the flames of war.21  And, at the same 
time, he explained the nation’s common cause with Britain and her free 
allies.  In the same address to Congress, FDR articulated a vision detailing 
the Four Freedoms and portraying a world in which the United States could 
find common cause not only with states such as Great Britain but also with 
individuals around the world regardless of nationality.22  FDR framed the 
Four Freedoms in a memorable appeal to principles and practicality: “In the 
future days, which we seek to make secure, we look forward to a world 
founded upon four essential human freedoms. . . . That is no vision of a 
distant millennium. It is a definite basis for a kind of world attainable in our 
own time and generation. That kind of world is the very antithesis of the so-
called new order of tyranny which the dictators seek to create with the crash 
of a bomb.”   
According to FDR’s special counsel, the President dictated these now 
famous words spontaneously a few days before, when reviewing the draft 
text of his address to Congress.  FDR may also have previously mentioned 
some version of them offhandedly at a July 1940 press conference.  
However, the words he dictated on New Year’s Day 1941 were by all 
accounts both improvised and revised only slightly before delivering them 
to Congress and the nation five days later.23  The brilliant spontaneity of the 
Four Freedoms may add to their allure as a statement of vision.  But 
Roosevelt clearly meant for them to be construed as establishing a coherent 
and binding agenda.  He started the dictation session by calling to his 
secretary, “Dorothy, take a law.”24  In an era before the government had 
ROBERT A. DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT: AMERICAN ENTRY INTO WORLD WAR II 
92 (1965) [hereinafter DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT]; ROBERT A. DIVINE, 
ROOSEVELT AND WORLD WAR II, at 29 (1969) [hereinafter DIVINE, ROOSEVELT AND WORLD 
WAR II]; PATRICK J. MANEY, THE ROOSEVELT PRESENCE: THE LIFE AND LEGACY OF FDR 126 
(1998).  As for FDR’s obfuscation, note Divine’s interpretation: “In 1939, Roosevelt 
evidently decided that candor was still too risky, and thus he chose to pursue devious tactics 
in aligning the United States indirectly on the side of England and France.” DIVINE, 
ROOSEVELT AND WORLD WAR II, supra, at __. 
 21. An Act to Promote the Defense of the United States, ch. 11, Pub. L. No. 77-11, 55 
Stat. 31 (1941) (commonly known as the “Lend-Lease Act”).  While Roosevelt argued that 
Lend-Lease might allow the United States to avoid entry into the war, he knew better.  The 
wizened Secretary of War, Henry Stimson, encouraged him to be more direct on this point.  
HENRY L. STIMSON & MCGEORGE BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 368 
(1948); see also JOSEPH E. PERSICO, ROOSEVELT’S SECRET WAR: FDR AND WORLD WAR II 
ESPIONAGE 83 (2001). 
 22. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 87 CONG. 
REC. 44, 46 (1941). 
 23. See SAMUEL I. ROSENMAN, WORKING WITH ROOSEVELT 262-63 (1952); Hon. 
Andrew S. Effron, Military Justice: The Continuing Importance of Historical Perspective, 
ARMY LAW., June 2000, at 1, 1-2; see also MARCUS RASKIN & ROBERT SPERO, THE FOUR 
FREEDOMS UNDER SIEGE: THE CLEAR AND PRESENT DANGER FROM OUR NATIONAL SECURITY 
STATE, at xvii-xviii (2006). 
 24. Rosenman, supra note __, at 263. 
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established a formal interagency process for drafting and declaring a 
national security strategy, FDR’s “law” was all that was required.25 
At first glance, the Four Freedoms may appear to present an unusual list 
of claims, containing two sets of civil or political rights (expression and 
religion), one bundle of indeterminate economic rights (want), and the 
previously unarticulated freedom from fear, which appears to provide a 
shorthand description of “peace on earth.”  Viewed in this way, the list 
includes two items derived directly from the U.S. Constitution, a third 
aspiring to globalize the New Deal economic agenda, and a fourth intending 
to restore Woodrow Wilson’s shattered vision for world peace. 
The Four Freedoms might alternatively be viewed as two pairs of 
freedoms.  The civil and political rights of expression and religion flowed 
from the values of the Enlightenment via the First Amendment to the U.S. 
Constitution.  The second pair may be viewed as products of FDR’s 
experience in office, dealing mostly with the alleviation of discontent by 
reducing people’s want and fear.  An enthusiastic supporter of Roosevelt’s 
vision, Louis Henkin acknowledged the novelty of FDR’s pairing.  “In his 
Four Freedoms message, Franklin Roosevelt articulated the new 
conception, wrapped – perhaps disguised – in the language of freedom, 
when he added freedom from want to the eighteenth-century liberties.”26  
The same can be said of the freedom from fear: wrapped as it was – and 
perhaps disguised – in a notion of arms control.  “The fourth is freedom 
from fear – which, translated into world terms, means a world-wide 
reduction of armaments to such a point and in such a thorough fashion that 
no nation will be in a position to commit an act of physical aggression 
against any neighbor – anywhere in the world.”27 
Indeed, the Four Freedoms could be viewed as a list or as two pairs.  
But to do them justice and use them most effectively, the Four Freedoms 
should be construed as a package and as animated by the spirit of a rule of 
 25. For a comparison to the post-war national security decision making process see 
Colin S. Gray, Strategy in the nuclear age: The United States, 1945-1991 in THE MAKING OF 
STRATEGY: RULERS, STATES, AND WAR (Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, & Alvin 
Bernstein, eds.) (surveying fourteen broad official strategy reviews from NSC 20/4 of Nov. 
23, 1948 to the G.H.W. Bush Administration national security review of 1989 and finding 
that they often repackaged old orthodoxy under the guise of new strategic thought); David 
Alan Rosenberg, Nuclear War Planning in HOWARD et al., THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note 
__ (describing the roles of Congress, the Presidents, and the military and the process of 
defining and redefining nuclear strategy and finding awkward, unwieldy and dangerous 
strategies). 
 26. LOUIS HENKIN, THE AGE OF RIGHTS 18 (1990).  Also, see Mary Ann Glendon, The 
Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 2 NW. U. J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 5, 
43 (2004) (“One basic assumption . . . was that poverty and discrimination often set the stage 
for atrocities and armed conflict.  That is why Franklin Roosevelt included the “freedom 
from want” among his Four Freedoms”). 
 27. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (Jan. 6, 1941), in 87 Cong. 
Rec. 44, 46 (1941). 
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law constructed upon respect for human dignity.  As will be discussed at 
greater length below, the Four Freedoms are most meaningful and useful 
when read altogether.  As a parcel of human rights and responsibilities, they 
yield a comprehensive policy for meaningful and enduring security.  Hence, 
FDR’s introduction to the Four Freedoms: “In the future days, which we 
seek to make secure, we look forward to a world founded upon four 
essential human freedoms.”28  The Four Freedoms must be read collectively 
in order to ascertain the full meaning of FDR’s wise prescription for 
security.  Part III of this article explores more fully how to read and employ 
them. 
In another important innovation that merits high-lighting, FDR’s vision 
of the Four Freedoms was explicitly universal in each of the elements and 
in its overall ambition.  He referred to the Freedoms as applicable anywhere 
and everywhere in the world.  In response to a question from a trusted 
advisor about whether it was America’s obligation to ensure the Four 
Freedoms for people of the East Indies, Roosevelt responded, “I’m afraid 
they’ll have to be some day, Harry [Hopkins].  The world is getting so 
small that even the people in Java are getting to be our neighbors 
now. . . .”29  FDR was articulating a globalized claim of human rights.  And 
people recognized it as such.  William Allen White, the so-called Sage of 
Emporia and unofficial spokesman for Middle America, exclaimed that 
FDR had granted “a new Magna Carta of democracy.”30  The audacity of 
this vision alone would have caused a stir, both in an isolationist U.S. 
Congress that had passed successive Neutrality Acts,31 and around a world 
ordered first and foremost by a robust interpretation of state sovereignty.   
FDR’s January 1941 address to Congress – announcing the Four 
Freedoms together with the Lend-Lease – received a wide range of 
responses.  Some Americans thought that Roosevelt had not gone far 
enough to meet the Fascist threat.  Some interventionists insisted that the 
United States join the besieged Allies immediately.  On the other side, some 
claimed that the President was dragging the country into the wrong war 
with the wrong enemy.  Uninspired and attempting to thwart Lend-Lease, 
leaders of the isolationist America First Committee continued to call for 
some sort of accommodation with the Axis rather than embarking on a 
 28. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, supra note __, at 46. 
 29. ROSENMAN, supra note __, at 264.  Established in the wake of World War I, the 
League of Nations had pretenses to this brand of universalism, but in actuality the League 
did not accomplish much to break up the colonial order that denied political rights to a 
majority of people around the world. 
 30. TOWNSHEND HOOPES & DOUGLAS BRINKLEY, FDR AND THE CREATION OF THE U.N. 
27 (1997) (citing William vanden Heuvel, The Four Freedoms, in STUART MURRAY & JOHN 
MCCABE, NORMAN ROCKWELL’S FOUR FREEDOMS: IMAGES THAT INSPIRE A NATION 108 
(1993)). 
 31. For more on isolationism and the Neutrality Acts, see DAVID M. KENNEDY, 
FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE AMERICAN PEOPLE IN DEPRESSION AND WAR, 1929-1945, at 394 
(1999). 
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mission to make the world safe for democracy.32 
Robert M. Hutchins, a progressive law professor and president of the 
University of Chicago, raised one of the more interesting critiques of the 
Four Freedoms speech, illuminating some of its appeal and its ambiguity.33  
A long-time supporter of FDR’s New Deal, Hutchins objected to Lend-
Lease on the grounds that it would bring the United States into the right war 
but that it would do so prematurely.  Hutchins embraced the vision but 
questioned the timing: “With the President’s desire to see freedom of 
speech, freedom of worship, freedom from want, and freedom from fear 
flourish everywhere we must all agree.  Millions of Americans have 
supported the President because they felt that he wanted to achieve these 
Four Freedoms for America.”34  However, Hutchins advocated securing 
those freedoms for Americans before taking on the Axis.  “We have want 
and fear today.  We shall have want and fear ‘when the present needs of our 
defense are past.’”35  Assuming (incorrectly, as it turned out) that British 
resistance would collapse, Hutchins advocated strengthening the American 
moral position and husbanding its resources before entering the inevitable 
war with Germany.  Moreover, Hutchins predicted that the drive to win 
such a war would throw the cause of U.S. freedoms back a generation or 
even a hundred years.36  Finally, Hutchins claimed that the “path to war is a 
false path to freedom.  A new moral order for America is the true path to 
freedom.”37  Pursuit of the Four Freedoms led the way to freedom; war did 
not.  At each point of his argument, however, Hutchins focused on the civil 
freedoms (expression and religion) or on the want that pervaded American 
society.  And when referring to the Four Freedoms collectively, he appears 
to have valued them as a means to “freedom” not to security.  Doing so, 
Hutchins was unable to grapple successful with the importance of the fourth 
freedom.  Apparently, even the most astute of observers did not know what 
to make of the freedom from fear when it was first revealed.  And as long 
as the fourth freedom remained undefined, the Four Freedoms would too. 
As Lend-Lease started to flow to the United Kingdom, FDR and 
 32. Elizabeth Borgwardt, When You State a Moral Principle, You Are Stuck with It: 
The 1941 Atlantic Charter as a Human Rights Instrument, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 501, 521 
(2006); DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT, supra note __, at 110. 
 33. A fascinating character, Robert M. Hutchins had previously served as Secretary of 
Yale University while attending its law school.  Upon graduation, he joined the faculty, 
rising to the rank of professor and dean in 1928 at the age of 29.  His tenure proved 
contentious, so he moved to the University of Chicago to serve as its president the following 
year.  Hutchins was a dedicated “champion of academic freedom.” GEOFFREY R. STONE, 
PERILOUS TIMES: FREE SPEECH IN WARTIME FROM THE SEDITION ACT OF 1798 TO THE WAR ON 
TERRORISM 314-18 (2004).   
 34. Robert M. Hutchins, America and the War, 10 J. NEGRO EDUC. 435, 436 (1941) 
(based on a text delivered on January 23, 1941). 
 35. Id. at 438. 
 36. Id. at 440. 
 37. Id. at 441. 
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Churchill strove to implement the tacit understanding that the President 
would try to do even more to help extinguish the fire threatening the Prime 
Minister’s house.  In August 1941, the two principal leaders of the free 
world convened secretly on warships in Placentia Bay off Newfoundland 
for a meeting that subsequently came to be known as the Atlantic 
Conference.38  Their discussions focused on Anglo-American cooperation 
in the military, diplomatic, and financial arenas.  Talks were driven by the 
shared recognition of the critical importance of meeting Britain’s materiel 
needs.  They were constrained by the still potent domestic political 
opposition facing President Roosevelt.   
Toward the end of this critical summit meeting, Roosevelt proposed 
issuing a statement on their Anglo-American vision for war and peace 
aims.39  FDR sought to provide that moral clarity that would distinguish 
their shared values from those of the Axis Powers.40  Seizing on the 
opportunity to cement the relationship, the British delegation quickly 
responded with a five-point proposal drafted by Permanent Under Secretary 
for Foreign Affairs Sir Alexander Cadogan.41 Apparently, Cadogan had 
brought on board his copy of the Four Freedoms speech, the principles of 
which he reflected in the draft Charter.  Three of Cadogan’s points proved 
easily adopted: pledging nonaggression, promising self-determination, and 
respecting forms of self-government that promoted the freedom of speech.42  
Cadogan’s other two points proved more contentious and were amended 
considerably before FDR signed on to them.43  One of Cadogan’s points 
proposed to support a vaguely liberal economic policy – a kind of freedom 
from want.  The other proposed to ensure world peace through the 
formation of a new organization dedicated to promoting and ensuring 
international peace and security, i.e. promoting the freedom from fear.44  
FDR and Under Secretary of State Sumner Welles revised the economic 
policy point to articulate a more explicit commitment to support, “with due 
respect for existing obligations,” of the easing of restrictions on trade, and 
access to raw materials on equal terms: “collaboration between all nations 
in the economic field with the object of securing, for all, improved labor 
standards, economic advancement, and social security.”45  Consistent with 
the intentions of the Four Freedoms generally, these economic and social 
arrangements were all drafted to bolster the security objectives. 
 38. DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT, supra note __, at 137-41. 
 39. Borgwardt, supra note __, at 519. 
 40. Borgwardt, supra note __, at 504. 
 41. Borgwardt, supra note __, at 519-20; see Hoopes & Brinkley, supra note __, at 36. 
 42. DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT, supra note __, at 134. 
 43. For detailed analysis of the drafting process, see Borgwardt, supra note __, at 519-
27. 
 44. DIVINE, THE RELUCTANT BELLIGERENT, supra note __, at 134. 
 45. The Atlantic Charter, Official Statement on Meeting between the President and 
Prime Minister Churchill (Aug. 14, 1941), in 10 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF 
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT, supra note __, at 314, 315. 
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In light of the circumstances leading to the drafting of the Atlantic 
Charter, its embrace of the Four Freedoms and emphasis on security is 
unsurprising.  In the Charter’s famous sixth point, FDR and Churchill 
proclaimed, “they hope to see established a peace which will afford to all 
Nations the means of dwelling in safety within their own boundaries, and 
which will afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out 
their lives in freedom from fear and want.”46  Notably, this point paired 
FDR’s freedom from fear with the freedom from want.  The Charter’s 
seventh point addressed freedom of the seas to prevent the kind of dispute 
that had brought the United States into the First World War.  The final point 
picked up and expanded on the original articulation of the freedom from 
fear: 
Eighth, they believe that all of the Nations of the world, for realistic 
as well as spiritual reasons, must come to the abandonment of the 
use of force.  Since no future peace can be maintained if land, sea, 
or air armaments continue to be employed by Nations which 
threaten, or may threaten, aggression outside of their frontiers, they 
believe, pending the establishment of a wider and permanent 
system of general security, that the disarmament of such Nations is 
essential.  They will likewise aid and encourage all other 
practicable measures which will lighten for peace-loving peoples 
the crushing burden of armaments.47 
With this point, the Atlantic Charter split FDR’s original notion of a 
freedom from fear into two parts and then combined one of them with the 
third freedom, the freedom from want.  Doing so, it divided the freedom 
from fear into an economic security strand and a peaceable 
disarmament/coexistence strand.  The Atlantic Charter also combined the 
economic portion with the freedom from want as if to explain or justify the 
aspiration for material well-being.   
The Atlantic Charter of August 1941 presented a somewhat different 
version of the Four Freedoms from that which FDR had presented to 
Congress just seven months before.48  The Charter both spliced the freedom 
from fear together with the freedom from want and appended it to issues of 
international conflict.  Doing so muddied the clear message that the 
 46. Id. Emphasis added. 
 47. Id. Townshend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley explain that the U.N. Charter limited 
the agenda of disarmament to aggressors and potential aggressors in order to avoid 
unnecessarily riling “extreme internationalists.” HOOPES & BRINKLEY, supra note __, at 39-
40. 
 48. The distinguished historian of war and peace, Paul M. Kennedy, attributes 
differences between the Atlantic Charter and the Four Freedoms to intentional vagueness on 
the part of the drafters.  PAUL KENNEDY, THE PARLIAMENT OF MAN: THE PAST, PRESENT AND 
FUTURE OF THE UNITED NATIONS 25 (2006). 
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freedom from fear had originally conveyed – that widespread possession of 
weapons gives rise to fears.  It redefined the freedom from fear, now with a 
dual nature.  On one hand, the Charter paired the freedom from fear with 
the freedom from want, implying a belief that want and fear together were 
the principal source of instability, and that they should be relieved as a way 
to preempt conflict.  This facet appears to reflect FDR’s New Deal 
programs which arguably saved the republic with bold platform of 
emergency relief payments, government-supported jobs, and the comforting 
voice of a fireside chat.  This agenda expressed the aspect of FDR’s 
political theory that he had memorably explained with great effect in his 
first inaugural address, “the only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”49  On 
the other hand, the Atlantic Charter’s formulation of the freedom from fear 
paired it with two traditional mechanisms for improving security (restoring 
a strong norm favoring freedom of navigation and establishing a new 
organization dedicated to ensuring international security).  America initially 
entered the First World War to ensure freedom of the seas.  During that 
war, the objective morphed into a more ambitious program to create a 
League of Nations that would not only ensure unfettered shipping but also 
secure worldwide peace through a form of global governance.  The Atlantic 
Charter’s formulation, therefore, reflects FDR’s experience as Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy Department in President Wilson’s cabinet during the 
earlier war.  This was the Roosevelt who had endorsed Wilson’s ill-fated 
Fourteen Points, including the “[a]bsolute freedom of navigation upon the 
seas . . . alike in peace and in war, [and]. . . [a]dequate guarantees . . . that 
national armaments [would be] reduce[d] to the lowest point consistent with 
domestic safety.”50  In this age of insecurity, FDR’s analysis of its causes 
was evolving.  With his emphasis on freedom of the seas, he echoed 
Wilson. 
Like any good mission statement, the Atlantic Charter inspired many 
and offended few.  It seems that everyone found something to like in it.  
Americans generally admired the Charter – albeit at an abstract level.51  
Anticolonialists around the world, such as the young Nelson Mandela 
struggling to liberate his native South Africa from the colonial domination 
of the Afrikaners, embraced its support for self-determination.52  Those 
who were least impressed with the Atlantic Charter labeled it an 
 49. Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, supra note __. 
 50. President Woodrow Wilson, The Fourteen Points (Jan. 8, 1918), available at 
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/wilson14.htm; see also ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN 
HISTORY 346 (Jeffrey B. Morris & Richard B. Morris eds., 7th ed. 1996). 
 51. Borgwardt, supra note 21, at 530 (citing two contemporary polls).  But see JOHN 
MORTON BLUM, V WAS FOR VICTORY: POLITICS AND CULTURE DURING WORLD WAR II, at 20 
(1976) (citing polls that “revealed that motivations for buying bonds did not much derive 
from enthusiasm for the New Deal or the Four Freedoms, or even from a sense of national 
peril.  Americans bought bonds for less lofty reasons, primarily to help a member of the 
family in the armed services....”). 
 52. Borgwardt, supra note __, at 532. 
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underwhelming example of hortatory prose because FDR had not also 
pledged U.S. entry into the war.53  But even they did 54
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor less than four months later 
resolved the questions of if, how, and when the United States would join 
the war.  But in the meantime, the Atlantic Charter offered a progressive 
vision that no one was bound to implement, so it was widely applauded.  
Thus, it provided an important gloss on the Four Freedoms over the critical 
years that followed. 
After the United States entered the war, notions about the Four 
Freedoms continued to develop as they entered the free world’s vernacular 
discourse.  The quintessentially American illustrator Norman Rockwell 
produced a series of posters translating the Four Freedoms into compelling 
graphic images.  In the fall of 1943, they graced the covers of four issues of 
the widely distributed Saturday Evening Post.55  Over the next few years, 
some 1.2 million people lined up to view Rockwell’s original posters as 
they toured the country.  Ticket sales for the tour raised $130 million 
dollars in war bonds.56  
 
Insert Image of Rockwell’s Freedom from Fear 
 
 Despite this enthusiastic reception, the editors of the Saturday Evening 
Post noted that the response to the freedoms they represented varied 
greatly.  One editorial explained, 
For millions of people throughout the world the Four Freedoms 
have come to represent something which gives meaning and 
importance to the sacrifices which the human race is now making, 
but these freedoms are by no means universally accepted as worthy 
aims for nations at war.  Indeed, a not inconsiderable number of 
people regard the Four Freedoms as actually evil, an effort to 
deceive people into imagining that they will never again have to 
take thought for the morrow, since government will provide 
everything for them.57 
The sympathetic editors of the Saturday Evening Post dismissed these 
concerns.  People should interpret the Four Freedoms more charitably.  
FDR was not, they argued, obliging the United States to fight wars 
 53. See id. at 526-30. 
 54. Id. 
 55. See Richard D. Parker, Homeland: An Essay on Patriotism, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 407, 423 (2002).  It is difficult to imagine Rockwell choosing instead to illustrate the 
Atlantic Charter with its more “realist” language. 
 56. Effron, supra note __, at 2. 
 57. Editorial, The Four Freedoms Are an Ideal, SATURDAY EVENING POST, Sept. 25, 
1943, at 112. 
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anywhere on earth to support each individual’s freedoms of speech and 
religion.  Nor was he promising to create a global welfare state; the freedom 
from want was an aspiration, not a panacea.  Finally, 
As to the Freedom from Fear, it seems to us to contain no meaning 
more revolutionary than that suggested by Norman Rockwell’s 
touching artistic interpretation, in the picture of parents regarding 
the untroubled sleep of their children.  Mr. Roosevelt expressed 
Freedom from Fear as translatable into “a world-wide reduction of 
armaments to such a point. . . that no nation will be in a position to 
commit an act of physical aggression against any neighbor.”  
Nothing about it guarantees against fear of measles, graying hair or 
the consequences of laziness or incompetence.58 
Thus the influential Post editors explained the Four Freedoms as 
“pretty well what men have always hoped for – political liberty, a better 
standard of living and an end to war.”59  While the editors did clarify the 
meaning of the civil freedoms and reassured readers that the freedom from 
want did not imply a welfare state, they left the freedom from fear with two 
connotations, not entirely without tension.  Did this freedom mean that 
parents would no longer have to worry about their children or that 
demilitarization would remove the scourge of warfare? Would it mean the 
end of all meaningful threats or just the end of a fear of military invasions? 
The war’s outcome no doubt would answer some of these critical questions. 
It is difficult for the historian to accurately assess the universality of 
acceptance of the Four Freedoms during the war.  It does appear reasonable 
to conclude that the Four Freedoms as a stand-alone mission statement were 
subsumed by the Atlantic Charter and then by the January 1942 Declaration 
by the “United Nations” (the Allies). 60  Even as the Charter and 
Declaration reflected their principles, many people continued to cite the 
original Four Freedoms to encapsulate the Allies’ common purpose.  While 
the content of the Four Freedoms was adopted into the legal texts, it 
continued to be best expressed by the language of the original formulation 
of the Four Freedoms.  The Librarian of Congress and poet Archibald 
MacLeish, acting in his capacity as part-time director of the government’s 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. See Borgwardt, supra note __, at 533, for a historical discussion of these 
documents and the human rights concepts during the war.  See generally HOOPES & 
BRINKLEY, supra note __.  Interestingly, Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson’s memoir 
(written in the third person with McGeorge Bundy) confuses the chronology while 
embracing articulation of the mission statement.  Writing shortly after the war, Stimson 
concluded:  “Some critics of American policy have judged it astonishingly naïve in this 
single-minded concentration on victory.  Stimson could not agree.  The general objectives of 
American policy had been clearly and eloquently stated by Mr. Roosevelt first in the 
Atlantic Charter and later (sic) in his assertion of the Four Freedoms.”  STIMSON & BUNDY, 
ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 565 (1947). 
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Office of Facts and Figures, polled the American people to find out what 
they thought about the Four Freedoms.  MacLeish reported to the President 
“[t]he Four Freedoms. . . have a powerful and genuine appeal to seven 
persons in ten.”61 
Elsewhere in the ever-smaller free world, political leaders also seized 
on the motivational value of the Four Freedoms.  During the grim month of 
July 1942 as the war came to Australia, Prime Minister Sir Robert Menzies 
devoted several radio addresses to the theme: 
President Roosevelt, in discussing the things at stake in this war, 
made use of an expression – The Four Freedoms – which has now 
found currency in most of our mouths. The four freedoms to which 
he referred were: freedom of speech and expression, freedom of 
worship, freedom from want, freedom from fear.  One has only to 
state them to get a response from the listener. Every one of us will 
at once say, “Ah yes, I believe in those freedoms. The President is 
right.” That the President is right I have no doubt myself; but that 
we either fully understand or believe in these freedoms is open to 
some question.  I propose therefore, in this and my next few 
broadcasts, to take each of these four freedoms and in turn, 
endeavour to get at its meaning and significance, and work out 
what it involves in our own living and thinking.62 
Menzies set out in the following weeks to define the Four Freedoms for 
the Australian people, primarily by promoting sacrifices to win the war and 
then a additional sacrifice of some sovereignty in order to ensure lasting 
peace.63  Likewise, New Zealand’s Prime Minister seized on the Four 
Freedoms to applaud the Allies’ sacrifices and illuminate the Allies’ 
common ground.  Addressing the Canadian Parliament in 1944, Peter 
Fraser observed, 
Your boys, boys of New Zealand, South Africa, India, the United 
States and all the united nations have given their lives that the Four 
Freedoms – freedom of speech, freedom of religion, freedom from 
fear and freedom from want – may be established and the masses of 
 61. BLUM, supra note __, at 29 (quoting Letter from Archibald MacLeish to President 
Franklin D. Roosevelt (May 16, 1942)).  For more on the Office of Facts and Figures, see 
CLAYTON R. KOPPES & GREGORY D. BLACK, HOLLYWOOD GOES TO WAR: HOW POLITICS, 
PROFITS AND PROPAGANDA SHAPED WORLD WAR II MOVIES (1990) 55-56 (noting that the 
Office of Facts and Figures had both objective research and propaganda functions). 
 62. Sir Robert Menzies, weekly radio address, cited at http://webdiary.com.au/cms/?q 
=node/930.  The texts of these radio essays are available at http://www. menzies 
virtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/ForgottenPeople/ForgottenCont.html. 
 63. See for instance, Sir Robert Menzies, weekly radio address, July 17, 1942, 
available at 
http://www.menziesvirtualmuseum.org.au/transcripts/ForgottenPeople/Forgotten6. html. 
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the people given greater opportunities than ever before.64 
Fraser emphasized the opportunities that would become available in a 
postwar world.  In sum, the meaning of the Four Freedoms continued to 
evolve throughout the course of the war.  While admired by all those who 
cited them, they offered variously peace, security, international cooperation, 
and greater opportunities. 
Roosevelt himself sought to clarify the ultimate objective of the Four 
Freedoms in his January 1944 annual address to Congress.65  Historians and 
humanitarians have paid inadequate attention to this remarkable speech.  
Cass Sunstein ruefully observes that FDR’s message had been lost to 
history despite its ambitious and apt proposal of a “Second Bill of 
Rights.”66  In it, FDR, optimistic about a favorable outcome of the war even 
after suffering two horrible years, iterated his view of “‘the one supreme 
objective for the future’. . . ‘in one word: Security.’”67  Echoing his January 
1941 formulation, FDR combined “‘physical security[,] which provides 
safety from attacks by aggressors,”‘ with “‘economic security, social 
security, [and] moral security.”‘68  As Sunstein notes, Roosevelt now 
insisted that “‘essential to peace is a decent standard of living for all 
individual men and women and children in all Nations.  Freedom from fear 
is eternally linked with freedom from want.”‘69  In this formulation, FDR’s 
clearly subsumed the Four Freedoms into one objective – security – as they 
had been in January 1941, but he chose to emphasize different elements.  
This first element (in contrast to the fourth freedom) addressed aggression.  
At the same time, Roosevelt abandoned the reference to demilitarization as 
the only way to achieve this security.  Indeed, the quest for disarmament 
may have been doomed from the start.  Back in January 1941 FDR paired 
his initial proposal for the Four Freedoms with the Lend-Lease program – 
the largest arms transfer in history.70  This was an inauspicious moment to 
propose worldwide disarmament.  So in January of 1944, FDR took the 
opportunity to recast the freedom from fear in a more practicable direction.  
The new iteration resembled less a utopian notion of disarmament and more 
the practical, mostly hands-off, “good neighbor policy” that characterized 
his own policy for Latin America.71  The ultimate objective of security 
 64. Borgwardt, supra note __, at 553. 
 65. President Franklin D. Roosevelt, State of the Union Address (Jan. 11, 1944), in 12 
THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT 32-42 (Samuel I. 
Rosenman ed., 1950); see also CASS SUNSTEIN, THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS: FDR’S 
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION AND WHY WE NEED IT MORE THAN EVER 4, 234 (2004). 
 66. See Cass R. Sunstein & Randy E. Barnett, Constitutive Commitments and 
Roosevelt’s Second Bill of Rights: A Dialogue, 53 DRAKE L. REV. 205, 206 (2005). 
 67. Id. (quoting Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, supra note __, at 33). 
 68. Id. (quoting Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, supra note __, at 33). 
 69. Id. (quoting Roosevelt, State of the Union Address, supra note __, at 34). 
 70. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, supra note __. 
 71. Extensive literature exists on the Good Neighbor policy.  See, e.g., ROBERT H. 
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remained the same, but the idealistic and ill-timed notion of disarmament 
gave way to the sense of community. 
While FDR’s thoughts on the meaning of the Four Freedoms evolved 
between January 1941 and 1944, his administration had supported scholarly 
research into the notion of fundamental freedoms.  During the war, 
interdisciplinary teams of academics at forty-six U.S. colleges and 
universities addressed the problem of developing an international bill of 
rights that a new international organization would in turn defend.  This 
diverse group of academics laid the groundwork for what would soon 
become the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights.  Charles A. Baylis, then an associate professor of 
philosophy at Brown University, published the synthesis document of the 
Universities Committee on Post-War International Problems.72  Not 
surprisingly, the Universities Committee viewed civil rights as the “most 
important to guarantee internationally, supposing that such a guarantee 
proves feasible.”73  Professor Baylis summarized the Universities 
Committee’s work: “By all odds the most frequently emphasized ones are 
freedom of expression and freedom of religion.”74  Following these civil 
rights in priority, Baylis placed the “next most popular rights [that] can be 
grouped loosely under the phrase ‘freedom from despotism.’ They are 
calculated to give all individuals the protection of due process of law 
without discrimination based on race, color, or religion.”75  Then followed 
the set of rights related to the exercise of voting.76  Only then did Baylis 
address the remaining of the Four Freedoms.  He tacitly dismissed the hope 
of enforcing the freedom from want by ignoring it in favor of a detailed 
discussion of the freedom from fear. 
Baylis divided the freedom from fear into two elements.  “Two of the 
famous Four Freedoms proposed by President Roosevelt and emphasized in 
the Atlantic Charter – freedom from fear and freedom from want – are 
widely acclaimed but are recognized as rather general terms which cover a 
number of quite different matters.”77  Baylis expanded on the second set: 
One aspect of freedom from fear is freedom from fear of external 
aggression.  This, which, if a right at all, is not an individual but a 
state right, is to be the primary aim of the international organization 
envisaged in the Moscow Declaration on General Security [i.e. the 
FERRELL, AMERICAN DIPLOMACY: A HISTORY 765-66 (3d ed. 1975) (offering a generally 
sympathetic but candid appraisal); Roosevelt, First Inaugural Address, supra note __. 
 72. Charles A. Baylis, Towards an International Bill of Rights, 8 PUB. OPINION Q. 2, 
244 (1944). 
 73. Id. at 248. 
 74. Id. (providing details on these rights). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 249. 
 77. Id. 
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United Nations]; it, more than any other right, is likely to be 
supported by adequate international guarantees.  Equally implicit in 
freedom from fear is the freedom from fear of such internal 
despotism as described above.  It too is urgently desired, but it 
seems unlikely that it will receive for some time the international 
support given to freedom from fear of aggression.78 
Through this and other efforts throughout the war, scholars and 
statesmen acknowledged the Four Freedoms as offering a sound basis for 
security in the postwar world.  And while scholars were heavily involved in 
formulating the security policies during the war, the process of establishing 
the United Nations organization based on the promotion of the Four 
Freedoms was anything but the product of ivory-tower philosophizing.  The 
freedoms of expression and religion were forged through centuries of 
political, legal, and military contests.  The freedom from want encapsulated 
FDR’s practical programs to combat unemployment, homelessness and 
hunger that characterized America’s grim experience during the Great 
Depression.  Likewise, the freedom from fear articulated a realist’s 
prescription for overcoming the deadly instability posed by a chaotic 
international order. 
Allied leaders around the globe read or heard FDR’s Four Freedoms 
speech.  They strove for a world in which security and peace were linked to 
and by these freedoms.79  During the course of the war, a consensus seemed 
to have developed that such a peace would be policed by the remaining 
great powers, the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union.80 The 
other leading powers either were on the losing side (Germany, Japan, and 
Italy) or incapacitated by the war (France and China, both of which would 
nonetheless soon claim permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council).  The 
fact that FDR’s original formulation envisioned demilitarization seems to 
indicate that he hoped for a world order that transcended the more 
traditional international security scheme that sought to maintain a balance 
of great powers.  Recognition that disarmament was not imminent and that 
great powers would remain immensely powerful only became explicit in the 
Charter of the United Nations – a document drafted shortly after FDR’s 
death in April 1945. 
The Second World War brought suffering on a previously unimaginable 
scale.  Unprecedented horrors – on the desolate Eastern Front, in occupied 
 78. Id.; see also Declaration of the Four Nations on General Security, Oct. 30, 1943, 9 
DEP’T ST. BULL., Nov. 1943, at 311 [hereinafter Moscow Declaration] (recognizing “the 
necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, 
based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to 
membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace 
and security”). 
 79. MARY ANN GLENDON, A WORLD MADE NEW: ELEANOR ROOSEVELT AND THE 
UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 10 (2001). 
 80. Maney, supra note __, at 165. 
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and fragmented China, in desperate island-hopping campaigns, and most 
notably in the Holocaust – catalyzed a newfound awareness of humankind’s 
capacity for brutality that quickened an impulse to recognize and protect 
human rights.  The months after Roosevelt’s death in April 1945 brought in 
quick succession the liberation of the Nazi death camps, the establishment 
of the United Nations organization, the explosion of the atom bombs over 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and the chartering of the international military 
tribunals at Nuremberg and Tokyo – each of which left an indelible mark 
on the world’s views about postwar security.   
Respect for a small body of fundamental rights coalesced in 
international law.  Most notably, the right to be free from genocide 
emerged, articulated with commendable clarity even if unevenly 
respected.81  Some rights – such as the freedom of expression – enjoyed a 
relatively smooth ride.  That is not to say that this freedom was consistently 
honored during the war.  Indeed most states – perhaps all – trammeled on it.  
At the end of the war, however, the freedom of expression did reemerge in 
a recognizable form and strengthened by the widespread recognition of the 
evils of political repression.  People increasingly understood that it was not 
only an individual freedom but also that it was indispensable for optimizing 
the efforts of governments.  Other rights emerged from the war nominally 
intact but somewhat altered.  The young freedom from fear was one such 
right.   
During the summer of 1945, the drafters of the U.N. Charter set out to 
institutionalize the Four Freedoms by establishing an international 
organization to ensure peace and security and to promote economic and 
social advancement.  Fifty-one nations negotiated, signed, and ratified the 
Charter intended to save humanity from “the scourge of war,. . . reaffirm 
faith in fundamental human rights,. . . establish conditions under which 
justice and respect for obligations can be maintained, and. . . promote social 
progress and better standards for life in larger freedom.”82  Because of their 
geopolitical significance (that is to say, their size and power), the United 
States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and France were 
endowed with permanent seats and vetoes in the dominant Security 
Council.83 The Permanent Five succeeded the Four Policemen, although 
their respective and collective roles remained subject to constant 
renegotiation.84  The U.N. Charter carried the Four Freedoms forward.  
 81. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 
1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277.  For background, see WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, 
GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2000); SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: 
AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE (2002). 
 82. U.N. Charter pmbl. 
 83. See generally KENNEDY, supra note __, at 3-47. 
 84. For some background on the notion of the United States, the Soviet Union, the 
United Kingdom, and China as the Four Policemen, see John Lewis Gaddis, The Long 
Peace: Inquiries into the History of the Cold War 23-24 (1987). 
22 JOURNAL OF NATIONAL SECURITY LAW & POLICY  [Vol. 3:N 
 
While the Charter contains little substantive law, Chapter IX does address 
the freedoms of expression and religion and the freedom from want.  Under 
this chapter, Article 55 requires the United Nations to promote “(a) higher 
standards of living, full employment, and conditions of economic and social 
progress and development; (b) solutions of international economic, social, 
health, and related problems. . . and (c) universal respect for, and 
observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without 
distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion.”85  Sections (a) and (b) 
address the freedom from want while section (c) responds to the freedom of 
expression and religion.  These issues are further addressed in the balance 
of Chapter IX and in Chapter X, which establishes the Economic and Social 
Council.86 
The most widely debated sections of the U.N. Charter address the 
freedom from fear and the new organization’s dedication to promoting 
security.  Chapter I describes the purposes and principles: 
To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to 
take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal 
of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression 
or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful 
means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and 
international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes 
or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace.87 
This text implies that fear is generated by threats to peace and acts of 
aggression.  Following this logic, the crime of aggression has increasingly 
become clarified international legal institutions.88 
The emergent emphasis on aggression differs from the assumption 
underlying FDR’s original formulation in the 1941 address to Congress that 
 85. U.N. Charter art. 55. 
 86. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights gives additional substance to these 
rights.  See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note __.  Specifically, Article 18 
recognizes a human right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion.  Articles 19, 20, 
and 21 detail and demand the freedoms of expression, including the right to hold opinions 
and impart them, to peaceably assemble and associate, and to take part in government.  
Articles 22, 23, and 25, among others, address the freedom from want.  Drafters of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights sought to expand on these 
rights and to make them more widely delivered, but success has been uneven at best.  See 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights art. 12.1, opened for 
signature Dec. 19, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Jan 3, 1976). 
 87. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1. 
 88. See the London Charter of the International Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 
Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279; Moscow Declaration. supra note 63; TELFORD TAYLOR, FINAL 
REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF THE ARMY ON THE NUREMBERG WAR CRIMES TRIALS UNDER 
CONTROL COUNCIL LAW NO. 10 (1949); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 
July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; International Criminal Court: Special Working Group on 
the Crime of Aggression, http:// www.icc-cpi.int/asp/aspaggression.html (last visited Oct. 
12, 2008). 
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implied that fear is caused by the level of armament or at least is best 
addressed by reducing the size of arsenals.  The 1941 address emphasized 
demilitarization as essential to reducing fear.  In contrast, the U.N. Charter 
is premised on a strong notion of individual state sovereignty that accepts 
the long-standing norm that states may do whatever they believe they must 
in to preserve their security – up until the point at which the Security 
Council determines “the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the 
peace, or act of aggression.”89  At this point, the Security Council, acting 
pursuant to authority granted in Chapter VII may authorize the use of force 
to restore the peace.  Disarmament or demilitarization would have reduced 
or removed the means available for conducting aggressive war, but it would 
have done so by materially interfering in the states parties’ domestic affairs.  
Instead, the Charter merely seeks to deter the use of force and apply it only 
when necessary and no permanent member of the Security Council vetoes 
it.  As noted above, disarmament may have been a nonstarter at this point in 
history, and thus it was not adopted into the basic texts of international law.  
Instead, the Charter targeted aggressors (or at least those who act without 
the aegis of a permanent member).  Actions taken pursuant to Chapter VII 
of the Charter do nothing to reduce the means or to de-escalate the 
militarization of international relations or to construe states’ freedom to do 
what they will within their own borders.  Instead, Chapter VII seeks to 
thwart overt acts of aggression.  Moreover, for forty-five years following 
the Charter’s enactment, with only the exception of the Korean War, the 
U.N.’s authority under Chapter VII was used only to stabilize the 
stalemated struggles of Great Power proxies,90 providing few incentives or 
means to facilitate demilitarization or the de-escalation of arms races.  
While this may or may not have been wise, the fact remains that it is 
significantly different from the method implied in the Four Freedoms 
address.  General demilitarization fell out of the Four Freedoms agenda 
sometime between early 1941 and the spring of 1945.  So the Four 
Freedoms – and even the freedom from fear – survived World War II, but 
meaningful efforts to disarm did not. 
Following the Second World War, the General Assembly of the new 
United Nations organization proclaimed the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, adopting the Four Freedoms as one piece in the preamble: 
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in 
barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and 
the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of 
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been 
 89. U.N. Charter art. 39. 
 90. For a concise history of the development of the U.N. peacekeeping and war-
making powers, see KENNEDY, supra note __, at 77-112. 
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proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the common people . . . . 91 
With this declaration, the Four Freedoms became part and parcel of a basic 
text of international law.  And while its incorporation into the Universal 
Declaration did not per se create binding legal obligations,92 its 
characteristic as basic law does offer an opportunity to cultivate a security 
strategy based on universally acknowledged norms.  And such a strategy 
need not belong merely to one country; instead it invites global support. 
Subsequent multinational conventions illustrate the universality that has 
enabled the Four Freedoms to survive in a dramatically changed world.  As 
just one example, the American Convention on Human Rights signed in 
1969 linked all Four Freedoms: “Reiterating that, in accordance with the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free men enjoying 
freedom from fear and want can be achieved only if conditions are created 
whereby everyone may enjoy his economic, social, and cultural rights, as 
well as his civil and political rights.”93  In this idealistic convention, 
security was not the objective; the ideal of free men was.  So while the 
ultimate purpose may be somewhat contingent, the widespread appeal of 
the Four Freedoms remains strong. 
III.  THE FOUR FREEDOMS ENDURE THE COLD WAR 
As noted above, the Four Freedoms remained an important if contested 
concept during the Cold War.  Even shorn of its disarmament agenda, the 
freedom from fear in particular remained a powerful if indeterminate 
concept from the mid-1940s until the early 1990s.  Louis Henkin 
optimistically labeled this epoch the “Age of Rights.”94  Professor Henkin 
noted that the stage was set at the end of the war with the adoption of the 
U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights as well as 
with the criminal convictions for crimes against humanity obtained at 
Nuremberg.95  The era ended in around 1991 when the geopolitical realities 
 91. Universal Declaration, pmbl. (emphasis added). 
 92. See, Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
infra note ___ 4 and Hannum, The Status of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 
National and International Law, infra note ___ 290, 320. 
 93. Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, pmbl., 
Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. 
 94. HENKIN, supra note __, at ix (1990).  Louis Henkin dates the start of this age at 
1948, with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, the categorization of this era as the Age of Rights does not reflect a 
consensus.  For example, Northwestern University historian Richard W. Leopold’s classic 
850-page survey of U.S. foreign relations does not refer to the Four Freedoms or the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights.  RICHARD W. LEOPOLD, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN 
FOREIGN POLICY: A HISTORY (1962).  It would be interesting to do a complete survey of 
diplomatic history texts to see how (or if) they treat human rights in this era. 
 95. HENKIN, supra note __, at 1 (1990).  The Nuremberg Principles issued in August 
1945 defined crimes against humanity to require a war nexus.  This requirement left a 
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changed dramatically with the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the onset 
of the Gulf War.  Defining the Age of Rights by reference to two wars and 
the promulgation of international human rights is to acknowledge that 
conceptions of human rights are embedded in geopolitical reality.  Violent 
conflicts framed the era, but Henkin hopefully labeled it by reference to 
rights and freedoms. 
Among the Four Freedoms, the freedom from fear was most subject to 
redefinition during the Age of Rights.  Because of its ambiguity and its 
universal appeal, freedom from fear quickly became a catchall phrase with 
divergent and frequently inexplicit meanings.  A few examples from 
English language books illustrate this point.  First Amendment lawyer 
Morris Ernst published a The First Freedom in 1946.96  He captioned the 
first chapter “Freedom from Fear,” by which he meant that governments 
should embrace, not fear, diverse speech, and thereby free themselves from 
their own fears that other views would prove harmful.  The book focuses 
entirely on the defense and promotion of free expression as essential for 
identifying social ills and refining solutions to them (i.e., the marketplace of 
ideas).  Likewise, New York State’s esteemed Superintendent of Insurance 
Louis Pink wrote his own book titled Freedom from Fear, a work more 
suited to the freedom from want, being a study of insurance and social 
security.97  Several years later, a British historian named O. A. Sherrard 
published a history of slavery through 1833, titled Freedom from Fear: the 
Slave and his Emancipation.98  The popular naturalist Aldo Leopold 
referred to the freedom from fear several times in his widely read A Sand 
County Almanac, first published in 1949.  The Almanac was ostensibly a 
collection of essays on natural history, but Leopold took frequent 
opportunities to reveal human nature as well.  In two instances, Leopold 
referred to the freedom from fear to decry the loss of the wilderness and 
man’s close relationship to nature.99  In the other instances, Leopold 
significant gap in the law limiting the mistreatment of individuals or minorities outside of a 
war environment.  For more historical context, see GLENDON, supra note 64, at 9. 
 96. MORRIS L. ERNST, THE FIRST FREEDOM (1946). 
 97. LOUIS H. PINK, FREEDOM FROM FEAR (1944). 
 98. O. A. SHERRARD, FREEDOM FROM FEAR: THE SLAVE AND HIS EMANCIPATION 
(1961). 
 99. Aldo Leopold, Chihuahua and Sonora, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND 
SKETCHES HERE AND THERE 137, 144 (1949) (comprised of some older works and some 
written specifically for the book).  “By this time the Delta has probably been made safe for 
cows, and forever dull for adventuring hunters.  Freedom from fear has arrived, but a glory 
has departed from the green lagoons.” Id.  No fan of the universal dominion of man over 
nature, even if man brought the freedom from fear, Leopold continued: “Man always kills 
the thing he loves, and so we the pioneers have killed our wilderness.  Some say we had to.  
Be that as it may, I am glad I shall never be young without wild country to be young in.  Of 
what avail are forty freedoms without a blank spot on the map?”  Id. at 148-49. The author’s 
copy of this book is from the forty-eighth printing of the 1968 paperback edition, testifying 
to the enduring and widespread popularity of this work. 
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illustrated the subjective nature of the freedom from fear.  In nature, he 
noted, one individual’s freedom from fear necessarily obstructed another’s 
freedom from want.  The field mouse’s freedom from fear meant hunger for 
the rough-leg hawk.100  The question for proponents of human rights is 
often whether humanity would rise above this harsh rule of nature.  Leopold 
was skeptical. 
Somewhat more optimistically, a generation later and half a world 
away, Burmese human rights and democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi 
adopted the theme and title Freedom from Fear in her 1990 acceptance of 
the European Parliament’s Sakharov Prize for Freedom of Thought.101  
Quite reasonably in light of her situation, Suu Kyi emphasized the 
importance of being free from fear of state oppression: 
Among the basic freedoms to which men aspire that their lives 
might be full and uncramped, freedom from fear stands out as both 
a means and an end.  A people who would build a nation in which 
strong, democratic institutions are firmly established as a guarantee 
against state-induced power must first learn to liberate their own 
minds from apathy and fear.102 
In other words, those who would be free from oppression must first free 
themselves of fear.  Once free from fear, they can remove the source of the 
oppression.  Suu Kyi’s vision of freedom from fear includes the notion that 
one liberates oneself from fear by becoming fearless, i.e., willing to accept 
unwelcome consequences for acting and doing nothing to prevent the others 
from imposing those them.  While brave and laudable, this is not the 
freedom from fear that FDR had described. 
None of these books addressed issues of international peace and 
security – let alone demilitarization.  So while the Four Freedoms survived 
the Age of Rights, their content remained contested and subjective.  In fact, 
as Mary Ann Glendon notes, during the late 1940s and 1950s, political 
pressures rended the package into incoherent pieces.  Its organic unity was, 
however, one of the first casualties of the Cold War.  The United States and 
its arch-rival, the Soviet Union, could not resist treating the Declaration as 
an arsenal of political weapons: each yanked its favorite provisions out of 
context and ignored the rest.  What began as expediency hardened into 
habit, until the sense of an integrated body of principles was lost.  Today 
the Four Freedoms and the Universal Declaration have become almost 
universally regarded as a kind of menu of rights from which one can pick 
 100. Aldo Leopold, January Thaw, in A SAND COUNTY ALMANAC AND SKETCHES HERE 
AND THERE, supra note __, at 3, 4. 
 101. AUNG SAN SUU KYI, Freedom from Fear, reprinted in FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND 
OTHER WRITINGS 3 (Michael Aris ed., 1991).  Freedom from Fear was first released for 
publication in various newspapers and magazines to commemorate the awarding in absentia 
of this prestigious human rights prize. 
 102. Id. at 183. 
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and choose according to taste.103  Perhaps treating them like a menu is an 
inevitable mistake, given the standard method of interpreting constitutions 
as a series of freestanding rules.  Lawyers and courts typically interpret the 
specific provision that appears most relevant for deciding the issue before 
them.104  However, FDR had not intended any one freedom to trump the 
others.  As Rene Cassin explained them, they may be considered a step 
leading to the entrance of a classical temple of rights.105  All other rights are 
columns resting on this step.  If viewed this way, they offer strong support 
for a principled international order. 
IV.  THE FOUR FREEDOMS AS A PARADIGM FOR PEACE AND SECURITY 
On this day, we gather because we have chosen hope over fear, 
unity of purpose over conflict and discord.106 
By restoring the Four Freedoms to a central place in its grand strategy, 
the United States can privilege hope over fear and unity of purpose over 
conflict and discord – at home and around the world.  History shows that 
states adjust their grand strategies for many reasons and that the success of 
these efforts depends in great part on the way they redefine themselves and 
their objectives.  The most obvious catalyst for a significant change in 
strategy is a catastrophic military defeat.  Under such circumstances, a state 
can collapse and subject itself to dictated terms (France in 1940) – or 
regroup and continue the fight (the Soviet Union, the following summer).  
Sometimes states adjust their strategy to accommodate the appearance of a 
significant new rival (Britain in the early twentieth century) or a new 
weapon (the 1950s development of nuclear weapons and delivery systems 
that created a situation of Mutual Assured Destruction).  In general, absent 
this sort of defining event, however, strategic adjustment is most successful 
when organized around an idea or ideology that captivates the nation and 
embraced by institutions of state security.107   
 103. GLENDON, supra note 64, at xviii.  Likewise, in the wake of 9/11 many leaders 
around the world re-focused their attention on the freedom from fear.  For example, 
distinguished Canadian lawyer and Member of Parliament Irwin Cotler defined human 
security as “freedom from fear – freedom from these pervasive terrorism threats to people’s 
fundamental rights, safety, or lives.”  Irwin Cotler, Terrorism, Security and Rights: The 
Dilemma of Democracies, 14 NAT’L J. CONST. L. 13 (2002) (rejecting the notion that new 
national security legislation is trading liberty for security when it is actually securing the 
freedom from fear). 
 104. See generally BREYER, supra note __ (arguing that provisions of the U.S. 
Constitution should be interpreted in light of--and to promote--its democratic objectives). 
 105. Glendon, The Rule of Law in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra 
note ___ citing to RENÉ CASSIN: FANTASSIN DES DROITS DE L'HOMME 317 (1979). 
 106. President Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/. 
 107. Mark Shulman, Institutionalizing A Political Idea: Navalism and the Emergence of 
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Wolfgang Friedmann correctly observed that “each generation has to 
draw afresh for itself a picture of the kind of world in which it lives, and to 
seek to define the goals which it is striving to reach.”108  If recognized as 
reflective of American values and appropriate for meeting the threats and 
opportunities facing the nation today, the Four Freedoms draw such a 
picture and frame those goals.  And if embraced by President Obama and 
the national security apparatus, they can serve as a wise guide for strategic 
adjustment at this critical moment.  Upon the President’s orders, they can 
be written into the new National Security Strategy and the various 
institutional mandates that it dictates.  As the previous section showed, this 
process began during the desperate years of World War II and stalled 
shortly thereafter.  It should be resumed today in order to bolster the law 
and order enterprise that enables civilization to squeeze out opportunities 
for extremists to construct far-flung networks and perpetrate their ugly 
crimes.   
Restoring the Four Freedoms to the centerpiece of grand strategy would 
advance the “Transnational Legal Process” hailed by some as a powerful 
force for ensuring security. 109  It would do so by constraining U.S. 
behavior to conform to the Four Freedoms, by building stronger norms to 
promote meaningful, just and enduring security, and by changing people’s 
minds about what actually constitutes meaningful security.  In short, it 
would help people realize that the nation’s well-being is best ensured by the 
maintenance of a rule of law system at the center of which is a respect for 
human dignity – and not by a myopic pursuit of military victories.   
Because they embody universal legal norms, the Four Freedoms 
provide a more useful framework for U.S. policy than the inopportune term 
“War on Terror.”  The Four Freedoms present a more descriptive, evocative 
and appropriate paradigm for national security decision making than did the 
concept that had until recently characterized U.S. policy since 9/11.  For 
purposes of this argument, the various terms used or proposed by the 
American Sea Power in THE POLITICS OF STRATEGIC ADJUSTMENT: IDEAS, INSTITUTIONS, AND 
INTERESTS (Peter Trubowitz, Emily O. Goldman & Edward Rhodes, eds., 1999); MARK 
RUSSELL SHULMAN, NAVALISM AND THE EMERGENCE OF AMERICAN SEA POWER 1882-1893 
(1995). 
 108. Wolfgang Friedmann, General Course in Public International Law, in 127 
RECUEIL DES COURS 39, 229 (1969) (Fr.) as cited by Antônio Augusto Cançado Trinidade, 
The Human Person and International Justice, 47 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 16, 18 (Spring 
2008 Wolfgang Friedmann Award address) (2008).   
 109. For more on this Transnational Legal Process, see Harold Hongju Koh, Filártiga v. 
Peña-Irala:  Judicial Internalization into Domestic Law of the Customary International Law 
Norm Against Torture, in INTERNATIONAL LAW STORIES (John E. Noyes, Laura A. Dickinson 
& Mark W. Janis, eds., 2007) citing to Harold Hongju Koh, The 1994 Roscoe Pound 
Lecture: Transnational Legal Process, 75 NEB. L. REV. 181 (1996).  See also Catherine 
Powell, The Role of Transnational Norm Entrepreneurs in the U.S. “War on Terrorism”, 5 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 47, 77 (theorizing about dialogic approaches to human rights 
norms, an iterative process whereby greater adherence to these norms leaders to further 
expansion of their recognition).   
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Administration of George W. Bush at different times are treated 
collectively, including not only “War on Terror” but also the “Global War 
on Terrorism,” “Long War,” “Global War on Islamic Extremism,” and 
other related terms.  At their center, each of these phrases contains the 
notion of a war.110  Unfortunately, the notion of war brings misleading and 
unhelpful connotations of start and stop dates, a special paradigm of 
constraints on conduct (jus in bello), a bias toward military solutions, and a 
state-centeredness. 
Labeling the current security situation as a war implicates untenable 
assumptions about a start date and an unambiguous ending.  Transnational 
terrorism has neither a Pearl Harbor moment nor the signing of an 
unconditional surrender on deck of a battleship.111  The jihadist threat 
existed and killed people for many years before 9/11.  And even when al 
Qaeda’s leaders are dead, captured, or otherwise retired from the fray, the 
United States may not recognize the end of the threat they posed.  Nor can 
the United States afford a war that may not end.  On the other hand, 
because it invests mostly in developing human capital rather than 
destroying it, the national can afford a campaign to promote the enduring 
values encompassed within the Four Freedoms.  As many scholars have 
noted over the years, “Better protection of human rights around the world 
would make the United States safer and more secure.”112  This is not to 
 110. E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, OFFICE OF THE COORDINATOR FOR COUNTERTERRORISM, 
COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2006, Ch. 5 (2007), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/ 
2006/index.htm; OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, DEP’T 
OF STATE AND OTHER INT’L PROGRAMS, BUDGET DOCUMENTS (2009), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/budget/fy2009/state.html;  U.S. DEP’T OF STATE & U.S. 
AGENCY FOR INT’L DEVELOPMENT, TRANSFORMATIONAL DIPLOMACY, JOINT STRATEGIC PLAN 
FISCAL YEAR 2007 – 2012, 18, 51 (2007), available at http://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/86291.pdf; Michael Hayden, Director, Central Intelligence Agency, 
Atlantic Council (Nov. 13, 2008), https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-
testimony/speeches-testimony-archive-2008/directors-remarks-at-the-atlantic-council.html.  
 111. Even in wars traditionally thought to have clearly defined start and stop dates, the 
limits can be contentious.  Steven I. Vladeck, Ludecke’s Lengthening Shadow: the 
Disturbing Prospect of War without End, 2 J. NAT’L SEC. L & POL’Y 53 (2006). 
 112. William W. Burke-White, Human Rights and National Security: The Strategic 
Correlation, 17 HARV. HUM RTS. J. 249 (2004).  Accord, Assessing Damage, Urging Action, 
infra note  , at 24 (concluding that “international human rights law was elaborated precisely 
to guarantee people’s safety.”) at 47 (“a military response to terrorism may seem to offer a 
short-term solution, but often creates long-term problems: a security perspective alone can 
become so dominant that other approaches are neglected, and human rights and the rule of 
law are undermined.”), 49 and ff. See also, numerous works by Harold Hongju Koh, for 
instance Civil Liberties and National Security, A conversation with Harold Koh, Norman 
Dorsen, and John Deutch, Moderated by Carl Kaysen (American Academy of Arts and 
Sciences) (Feb. 4, 2002) (“If the globalization of freedom is going to triumph over the 
globalization of terror, in the long run, we—as a nation conceived in liberty and dedicated to 
certain inalienable rights, including liberty and justice for all—must respond not just with 
power alone, but with power coupled with principle.”) available at http://www.amacad. 
org/events/civil_liberties.pdf. 
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suggest that military operations have no place in dealing with al Qaeda, but 
it does require that all such operations shall be undertaken in accordance 
with the demands of human rights law and humanitarian law.  Security will 
not come through a suspension of the ordinary rule of law – a set of 
constraints designed specifically to provide order and security.  Rather, the 
rule of law is generally both the best measure and the most effective means 
of promoting security.  
The notion of a global war implicates a suspension of the ordinary rule 
of law and an activation of the laws of war – everywhere or possibly 
nowhere.  This specialized body of law is poorly suited to regulating 
relations between strong states and militant fundamentalists.  The Islamists’ 
jihad does not have the state or legal mechanisms, defined geographical 
boundaries or battlefields, the uniforms, repeat transactions, or shared sense 
of chivalry necessary for sustaining the laws of war.  Historically, this body 
of law has always been strained by wars of liberation, civil war, or other 
nontraditional modes of combat.113  And it disintegrates (or more accurately 
fails to coalesce) when governments or armies fail to learn how to apply it 
because “[t]here [is] no time for reciprocity to develop.”114  As a result, 
labeling the current situation a “war” puts the United States and its allies 
under obligations to comply with the laws of war where they may or may 
not be relevant.  Certainly, in portions of Afghanistan and Iraq the 
conditions of war continue to exist.115  Where combat falls under the 
mandate of international humanitarian law, that body of principles should 
be applied, as in the operations against the Taliban’s armed forces in 
southern or eastern Afghanistan.  However, the concept of warfare 
generally fails to explain operations in such contested venues as Baidoa, 
O’Hare International Airport or cyberspace.  So the laws of war are 
impractical in many of the places where U.S. interests are being contested.  
That does not leave a void of law.  Municipal law, human rights law, and at 
least some Constitution restraints apply, and “access to an independent 
judiciary is absolutely essential.”116  Fortunately, the Four Freedoms can 
 113. See George J. Andreopoulos, The Age of National Liberation Movements, in THE 
LAWS OF WAR: CONSTRAINTS ON WARFARE IN THE WESTERN WORLD 191-213 (Michael 
Howard, George J. Andreopoulos & Mark R. Shulman eds., 1994); Michael Howard, 
Constraints of Warfare, in THE LAWS OF WAR, supra, at 1-11.   
 114. Geoffrey Parker, Early Modern Europe, in THE LAWS OF WAR, supra note __, at 
57. 
 115. Accord Maqaleh v. Gates, Civil Action No. 06-1697, (D.D.C. Apr. 2, 2009) 
generally and in particular at footnote 6 (applying the rule of Boumediene v. Bush (infra 
note __) to cover non-Afghan detainees at the U.S.-controlled Bagram Airfield while 
signaling “deference to the Executive’s conduct of the war in Afghanistan.”).   
 116. Assessing Damage, Urging Action, infra note ___, at 43, 51 (“no such black hole 
exists in either in international human rights or humanitarian law”).  Boumediene v. Bush, 
128 S. Ct. 2229, 2259 (2008) (“Our basic charter cannot be contracted away like this . . . .  
Even when the United States acts outside its borders, its powers are not ‘absolute and 
unlimited’ but are subject ‘to such restrictions as are expressed in the [C]onstitution.”‘ 
(quoting Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885))). 
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sensibly be applied everywhere. 
Finally, labeling the situation a war almost inevitably implicates the use 
of armed forces – with ensuing risks and costs.  As brave and capable as 
members of America’s professional armed forces are, they are inherently 
incapable of addressing the full range of threats we face.  Since the tragic 
war in Vietnam, western militaries have learned – or relearned – the art of 
unconventional warfare.  These skills have enabled soldiers to function 
effectively in forests, villages, and in cities.  New technology has even 
enabled modern armies to engage in combat in cyberspace.117  But they are 
not capable of discriminating between financial transactions and 
communications of terrorists and those of civilians.  So using armed forces 
to interdict these interactions raises the costs of collateral damage to 
intolerably high levels.118  And while they can adapt to tackle 
nontraditional, psychological, propagandistic, urban, financial threats, 
doing so will significantly degrade their war-fighting capacity.  Armed 
forces are exceedingly expensive, and in such a sprawling, amorphous 
campaign, it is misguided or misleading to think that the United States can 
or should address challenges principally with the machinery of war.  
Moreover and ironically, by deploying military resources, we reify the 
threat, giving it an undeserved quantum of legitimacy.  The Bush 
administration’s “War on Terror” bolstered the jihadists by honoring their 
anarchic campaign as a war.  The United States contributed significantly to 
their recruitment efforts when it unnecessarily exposed fine soldiers and 
marines to their suicide bombers.  Similarly, incidents of torture and other 
cruel, inhumane and degrading treatment foster support or at least sympathy 
for the nation’s enemies.119  The state-centeredness of a war paradigm 
likewise gives al Qaeda a higher profile and more opportunities to cultivate 
recruits and develop partners. 
Now that the Obama administration has dropped the characterization of 
“war,” this article proposes adopting a grand strategy defined by effort to 
promote and protect the values articulated in the Four Freedoms.  Dropping 
the concept of a “War on Terror” enables the Obama administration to 
avoid or extract the nation from many of the traps into which the previous 
 117. See Mark R. Shulman, Note, Discrimination in the Laws of Information Warfare, 
37 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 939 (1999) (arguing for continuation of the laws of war to the 
then nascent activity of cyber-warfare). 
 118. See ERIC LICHTBLAU, BUSH’S LAW: THE REMAKING OF AMERICAN JUSTICE (2008) 
(describing the resistance of Congress and the American people to defense programs that 
intercept electronic communications and information about financial transactions). 
 119. See the “Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry Into The Treatment Of 
Detainees In U.S. Custody” (Dec. 11, 2008) (citing Former Navy General Counsel Alberto 
Mora’s testimony that “there are serving U.S. flag-rank officers who maintain that the first 
and second identifiable causes of U.S. combat deaths in Iraq – as judged by their 
effectiveness in recruiting insurgent fighters into combat – are, respectively the symbols of 
Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo.”) the redacted Executive Summary of which is available at 
http://levin.senate.gov/newsroom/supporting/2008/Detainees.121108.pdf. 
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Administration had stepped.  For just as wise and successful leaders avoid 
unnecessary wars, they should what they can to avoid clashes of 
civilizations.  The United States can now avoid unnecessarily putting 
neutrals in a tight position.  It is unnecessary and misguided to compare the 
actions of the United States to those of the Taliban or al Qaeda.  
Unfortunately the logic of war dictates an unhelpful “us versus them” 
rhetoric that demands such comparisons.  A grand strategy based on the 
pursuit of meaningful values, on the other hand, invites all people to strive 
to be their best selves.  The experience of the past eight years shows that in 
a “War on Terror,” the freedom from fear tends to trump other concerns.  
This leads to a situation in which a President declares “[y]ou are either with 
us or you are against us in the fight against terror.”120  Once that Manichean 
division is made, other countries are either good or bad, and other freedoms 
give way.  America’s right to be free of fear claims to trumps the rights of 
individuals to freedom of expression or religion or to be free from want or 
fear themselves.121   
More generally, the United States should strive purposefully to avoid 
triggering a clash between the pluralistic “West” and “Islam.”  But by 
declaring “wars,” Samuel Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” could 
become a self-fulfilling prophecy.  Indeed, one learned observer claims that 
this was Huntington’s intention and that senior members of the Bush 
administration embraced that mission. 122  To extricate itself from this trap, 
the United States should protect and promote values that have received near 
universal acclaim and that are embodied in domestic and international law 
around the world.  As the Eminent Jurist Panel on Terrorism, Counter-
terrorism and Human Rights concluded, “Human Rights can no longer 
remain a rhetorical add-on to counter-terrorist thinking, but must become a 
central plank in the global response to terrorism.”123  Embracing the Four 
 120. Press Release, Office of the White House Press Secretary, President Welcomes 
President Chirac to White House (Nov. 11, 2001), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/ 
news/releases/2001/11/20011106-4.html. 
 121. See Jeremy Waldron, Safety and Security 85 NEB. L. REV. at 454, 482-485 (2006) 
(noting unequal and unfair distribution of security benefits of a simplistic trade off of liberty 
for security). 
 122. The late Samuel P. Huntington introduced this concept in a widely read article, 
The Clash of Civilizations?, FOREIGN AFF., Summer 1993, at 22, and expanded on it in THE 
CLASH OF CIVILIZATIONS AND THE REMAKING OF WORLD ORDER (1996).  Likening him to 
Islamic radicals, Stephen Holmes accuses Huntington of having intended the “clash of 
civilizations” to become self-fulfilling.  Holmes argues “By painting their respective 
enemies as more unified and aggressive than they actually are, both Huntington and Islamic 
radicals hope to boost solidarity and awaken warlike passions on their own side.”  Searching 
for the New Enemy after the Cold War, in THE MATADOR’S CAPE: AMERICA’S RECKLESS 
RESPONSE TO TERROR 131-132 (2007)).  Professor Holmes goes on to say that Huntington 
succeeded in the wake of 9/11, observing that Vice President Richard Cheney’s speeches 
“after the terror attacks conveyed almost a sense of relief that here finally was a global 
enemy on the scale of communism” (citing reporting by George Packer) at 154. 
 123. Eminent Jurists Panel on Terrorism, Counter-terrorism and Human Rights, 
Assessing Damage, Urging Action, 13 (2009). 
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Freedoms offers just this opportunity.  Individually, they derive from a 
U.S.-framed consensus of enlightenment values.  And they were quickly 
adopted as part and parcel of international law.  They enable governments 
to draw on the entire range of security assets, including the nation’s 
diplomatic, military, intelligence, and economic apparatus, as well as on 
immense power yielded by the authentic and consistent application of the 
rule of law – including the criminal justice systems of the United States and 
countries around the world.  Moreover, this campaign would enable the 
United States to focus on promoting basic human rights that will rebuild the 
goodwill that has enabled the country to inspire good and to wield so much 
soft power over the years. 
On the other hand, declarations of war have frequently brought 
psychosocial advantages to those who seek it, so abandoning the “War on 
Terror” may undermine the nation’s will to pursue security objectives.  
Perhaps a campaign to promote and defend Four Freedoms will prove 
insufficiently rousing.  Perhaps the American people need the rhetoric of a 
war to muster sufficient resources to “win.” Some parents will quite 
reasonably balk at sending their sons and daughters to fight and die for the 
sake of protecting universal freedoms.  And indeed they should.  For at 
least the near future, the United States cannot easily extricate itself from the 
actual wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.  As a result, some brave Americans 
will be injured or die in these faraway lands.  For better and for worse, 
these remain actual wars.  Moreover, the pursuit of the Four Freedoms may 
even lead to another war.  In 1941, the Four Freedoms did not preclude or 
prevent war.  However, they did provide a framework for making sensible 
foreign policy decisions, including whether a war is necessary.  They 
provide an informed and humane structure that allows nations to order 
priorities and allocate resources.  Presumably – but not inevitably – with 
this decision-making framework, fewer young people will die in wars of 
choice.  And parents will continue to accept these terrible sacrifices for the 
sake of liberty and security. 
Even so, while a campaign for the Four Freedoms offers significant 
advantages, it is too indeterminate to constitute a completely satisfactory 
solution.  Each freedom is briefly stated and culturally contingent enough 
that defining it presents ample opportunities for disagreement, 
disingenuousness, and sincere conflicts of interest.  President George W.  
Bush’s second inaugural address offers one notable example of the 
indeterminacy of a freedom agenda.  Echoing FDR’s January 1941 address, 
Bush proclaimed, “The best hope for peace in our world is the expansion of 
freedom in all the world.”124  At first blush, Bush’s war of aggression 
against Iraq, the extraordinary renditions, and the water-boarding, all 
conflict with the expansion of freedom.  Defenders of these policies might 
 124. President George W. Bush, Second Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2005), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/01/20050120-1.html. 
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argue that the pursuit of freedom requires some limited tradeoffs.  That, of 
course, is precisely the problem with reading the Four Freedoms as items 
on a menu.  Doing so invites choices and trade-offs.  Rather, they must be 
read collectively and with an eye toward finding interpretations that will 
achieve the general objective of security through the pursuit of freedoms of 
expression and belief and from want and fear.  Rather than framing security 
as a question of trade-offs, it could be described as a set of opportunities.  
Doing so may not end the trading off of values for security completely, but 
should result in fewer and more carefully calculated sacrifices. 
Barack Obama has already made a serious effort to interpret the Four 
Freedoms.  In his 2006 book, The Audacity of Hope, he described them and 
chose to emphasize the priority of the third and fourth freedoms.  “Our own 
experience tells us that those last two freedoms –freedom from want and 
freedom from fear – are prerequisites for all others.”125  Happily, his more 
recent expressions treated them as one formula for U.S. foreign relations.  
In May 2008, he discussed the tumultuous history of inter-American 
relations. 
What we all strive for is freedom as FDR described it.  Political 
freedom.  Religious freedom.  But also freedom from want, and 
freedom from fear.  At our best, the United States has been a force 
for these four freedoms in the Americas.  But if we’re honest with 
ourselves, we’ll acknowledge that at times we’ve failed to engage 
the people of the region with the respect owed to a partner.126 
Clearly, Obama understands the importance of the Four Freedoms as an 
expression of American – and shared – values.  But the question remains 
open about how to apply those values. 
Justice Stephen Breyer’s method of interpreting the Constitution is 
helpful here for offering a useful model interpretation.  In Active Liberty, 
Breyer examines six constitutional doctrines (including free speech) one 
after another and each as they relate to the basic purpose of the 
Constitution’s essential nature as an instrument of a democracy.127  By 
articulating the overall purpose of the Constitution, he provides a structure 
for facilitating analysis that works through some of the ambiguities, 
tensions, and conflicts in its text.  For Breyer, this method leads to statutory 
and constitutional interpretations that are consistent with the people’s 
will.128   
The Four Freedoms should be read similarly.  As noted above, the 
 125. BARACK OBAMA, THE AUDACITY OF HOPE: THOUGHTS ON RECLAIMING THE 
AMERICAN DREAM 317 (2006). 
 126. Remarks of Senator Barack Obama: Renewing U.S. Leadership in the Americas 
(May 23, 2008).  2008 WLNR 981527. 
 127. Breyer, supra note __.  Ambassador Glendon makes a similar point for 
interpreting the Universal Declaration.  GLENDON, supra note __, at xviii. 
 128. BREYER, supra note __, at 115. 
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overall objective that Roosevelt articulated back in January 1941 was to 
achieve a world “which we seek to make secure . . . [and] founded upon 
four essential human freedoms.”129  The Four Freedoms should be read to 
promote this objective.  Even read generously, however, the Four Freedoms 
cannot provide detailed policy prescriptions, but they do offer a concise 
statement of the values that a people promote and of the aspirations against 
which policies can be evaluated.   
Allowing one of the Four Freedoms to overwhelm the others leads to 
iniquity and instability.  If all four are treasured and weighed together in 
crafting foreign policy, FDR implied, then the outcome may prove more 
enduring.  The freedom of expression should ensure that women can attend 
school and participate in civil society in Afghanistan where they face 
Taliban oppression and in Pakistan where the state cannot or will not fund 
decent schools for women.  The Four Freedoms may support efforts in 
those countries to invest in education that produces greater wealth and more 
stability.  Respect for freedom of belief should ensure equal treatment for 
religious minorities in Baghdad where they are forced behind blast barriers 
and on the New Jersey Turnpike where they face racial profiling.130   
Moreover, support for policies that promote these universal values 
would give people around the world a meaningful sense of participating in a 
common enterprise of guiding decision makers to more enlightened 
policies.  Protectionist tariffs that drive up the price of food result in hunger 
and want in ways that starkly mirror the effects of warlords blocking the 
flow of emergency relief supplies.  Freer markets for foodstuff should lead 
to less want.131  And torture and other so-called “alternative interrogation 
techniques” are irreconcilable with the freedom from fear, much as are 
attacks on hotels, office towers, or transit systems.  Neither can be tolerated 
because they violate the individual’s freedom from fear and society’s 
demands for common decency.  For democracies to prevail and achieve 
FDR’s vision for security, they must fund schools, resist impulses to 
profile, reduce tariffs, and desist from using fear as a tool.  But mostly, 
policy decisions should be made to account for all the freedoms and should 
do so as for individuals as well as for states. 
If the United States shifts to a campaign to protect the Four Freedoms, 
what should be said about the “War on Terror”?  Notwithstanding the 
rhetoric of war, even the Bush administration and other governments did 
deploy nonmilitary instruments such as bilateral, multilateral, and 
international diplomacy, human and technical intelligence, public relations, 
 129. Roosevelt, Message to Congress, supra note __, at 46-47. 
 130. David Kocieniewski & Robert Hanley, Racial Profiling Was the Routine, New 
Jersey Finds, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2000, at A1. 
 131. See Raj Bhala, Generosity And America’s Trade Relations With Sub-Saharan 
Africa 18 PACE INT’L L. REV. 133 (2006) (arguing that generosity to the less fortunate should 
play a role in U.S. trade policy). 
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antiracketeering (anti-money laundering regimes, extraditions, and criminal 
trials), counter-proliferation regimes, scholarship, and even the occasional 
charm offensive.  Unfortunately, President Obama’s inaugural address 
characterized the situation as a war.  “Our nation is at war, against a far-
reaching network of violence and hatred.”132  At least this characterization 
marks a shift to a more accurate characterization of the enemy as a network 
not a tactic.133  However, in his first few weeks in office, the President 
distanced himself from the concept of a “war on terror,” and he has quickly 
moved to dismantle some of its most destructive and infamous elements.  
As weeks turn to months, he appears to be going even further and 
abandoned the term “War on Terror.”134  As the president continues to 
move further away from the concept of a war, he will be in a better position 
to reconstitute a coalition of states, non-state actors, nongovernmental 
organizations, international organizations, and individuals around the world 
who do believe in the freedoms of religion and speech, and want a world 
free of want—and of fear. 
CONCLUSION 
History shows that the Four Freedoms can sustain the hard-nosed 
realism of security.  While there are compelling deontological reasons for 
promoting them, Roosevelt was not a philosopher.  He understood that the 
Four Freedoms offer practical prescriptions for maintaining international 
peace and security.  The Four Freedoms recognize the impulses and needs 
of each person and seek to channel them toward mutual respect and 
cooperation or at least toleration.  Acknowledging these fundamental needs 
encourages the formation of institutions designed to maximize the release 
of each individual’s creative energy.  The fact that the U.S. domestic order 
respects the freedoms of expression and religion and sustains institutions 
that alleviate want and fear goes much further toward explaining America’s 
security – and its prosperity –  than do the bounty of natural resources with 
which the land is blessed.  And if this framework can enable a sprawling, 
heterogeneous, and fractious country such as the United States to thrive, 
then it has a chance of working around the world. 
 132. President Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address (Jan. 20, 2009) available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/inaugural-address/.  Attorney-General designate Eric 
Holder also characterized the situation as a “war” in his initial confirmation hearings, a 
response that earned a warm endorsement from Senator Lindsey Graham (R-SC).  
Associated Press, Obama’s AG pick earns praise, GOP support, Jan. 16, 2009 available at 
http://www. npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99380499. 
 133. An insightful blog entry examines Great Britain’s turn away from the concept of a 
“war on terror” because it was deemed misleading and unhelpful.  Mike Nizza, Britain 
Deserts War on Terror (the Phrase) THE LEDE FROM THE N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 16, 2007, 
available at http://thelede.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/04/16/britain-deserts-war-on-terror-the-
phrase/. 
 134. See supra note 2. 
2009] THE “WAR ON TERROR” IS OVER – NOW WHAT?  37 
 
 
Former British Prime Minister Tony Blair noted recently, “We will not 
win the battle against global extremism unless we win it at the level of 
values as much as that of force.  We can win only by showing that our 
values are stronger, better, and more just than the alternative.”135  
Unfortunately, Blair framed the issue as a “battle.”  Values are not only 
tested in battles; they have often been destroyed in the process of fighting 
battles.  That said, Blair’s basic message remains vivid and important:  
“This is not [a] clash between civilizations; it is a clash about 
civilization.”136  Just as President Roosevelt worked with Prime Minister 
Churchill in 1941 to frame the Atlantic Charter, the American President 
could have profited in 2001 from a more meaningful collaboration with his 
British counterpart.  However, at the end of the day, neither President Bush 
nor Mr. Blair actually articulated those particular values that define 
civilization.  Happily, their predecessors did so when they reflected the 
Four Freedoms into the Atlantic Charter.  With the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights, those same values were incorporated into the fundamental 
texts of international law.  Today, those same Four Freedoms offer a 
framework for an effective security strategy.  And as noted above, Barack 
Obama recognizes them providing as a valuable guide.  And he has vowed 
to end torture, close Guantanamo, and to “reject, as false, the choice 
between safety and our ideals.”137 
The principal value this framework offers is as an integrated 
interpretative tool, much like Justice Breyer’s notion of active liberty.  The 
United States faces many significant threats to its long-term security and 
prosperity.  These include the effects of climate change, degradation of the 
natural and built environments, energy insecurity, organized crime, shifting 
global employment patterns that accelerate growth of wealth disparities and 
destabilize communities, and yes, the possibility that a terrorist may use a 
weapon of mass destruction.  But declarations of war – against poverty, 
crime, drugs, or terror – do not constitute practical solutions.  By 
privileging a narrow interpretation of the freedom from fear over other 
freedoms, the language of war demands that all other policy objectives 
automatically assume lower priority.  Waging wars also tends to occlude 
power in the executive who is charged by the Constitution with the 
principal responsibility for waging war.  In sum, by declaring one of these 
wars, policy makers unhelpfully limit the nation’s ability to make rational 
decisions about the allocation of resources.  When compared with the 
pursuit of a “War on Terror,” the elegance of the Four Freedoms as a 
strategy is its facilitation of policies informed by objective intelligence, 
composed through rational decision making, and implemented strategically 
 135. Tony Blair, A Battle for Global Values, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.-Feb. 2007, at 79. 
 136. Id. at 82.  Of course, many people have made this point without also committing 
their nation’s troops to an aggressive war. 
 137. President Barack Hussein Obama, Inaugural Address, supra note ___. 
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and enthusiastically by a united and respected nation. 
